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PRODUCTS: WHAT LOSSES ARE
RECOVERABLE?*
DAVID E. BLAND t
&
ROBERT M. WATTSON$
Courts across the country have had dijfficulty applying tort principles to
cases involving allegedly defective products that cause property damage
without resulting personal injuy. The diffulty results from the distinc-
tion that the courts draw between property damage recoverable in tort and
"economic loss" recoverable only in warranty. The authors provide the
practitioner with the framework within which to analyze property damage
claims seeking recovery of damages for. (1) injury to the product itself,
(2) injury to property other than the product itself, and (3) loss of use,
lost profits, and interruption of business. The discuss the definitive deci-
sions and policy reasons supporting the majority and minority views in
each category. Finally, the authors discuss special problems that may face
commercial plaintifi seeking recovety for damage to property.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Most product liability claims involve an allegedly defective
product which causes personal injury. Defective products, how-
ever, also cause damage to property without resulting personal in-
jury. A party whose property is damaged should investigate
proceeding against the manufacturer or others in the chain of dis-
tribution under any of five theories:
1. Breach of express or implied warranty;
2. Misrepresentation;
3. Breach of contract;
4. Negligence; or
5. Strict liability in tort.
An injured plaintiff will seek recovery for property damage fall-
ing into one or more of three categories: (1) damages for injury to
the product itself, (2) damages for injury to property other than
the product itself, and (3) damages for loss of use, lost profits, and
interruption of business resulting from the injured party's inability
to use the product or other property during the period of replace-
ment or repair. This article will discuss those situations where the
law of negligence and strict liability provides an injured plaintiff
with a remedy for property damage caused by a product and those
situations where no tort remedy is available. Since the courts have
adopted different rules governing the recovery of damages for in-
jury to the product itself,' for injury to property other than the
1. See infra notes 16-114 and accompanying text.
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product itself,2 and for loss of use, lost profits, and interruption of
business,3 each category will be treated separately.
II. DEFINING THE PROBLEM
The development of the theories of negligence and strict liability
in tort as applied to cases involving defective products has been
well documented, 4 and will not be restated here. It is important to
point out, however, that shortly after the now-famous decision by
Justice Cardozo in MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 5 the MacPherson
theory was applied to cases involving property damage only.
6
Similarly, the landmark decision by the New Jersey Supreme
Court in Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 7 was applied to cases
involving property damage only.8 Dean Prosser, one of the mov-
ing forces behind the development of strict liability theory, advo-
cated its use in cases involving only property damage.9 The
American Law Institute clearly contemplated that strict liability
applied to cases involving damage to property when it adopted
section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. 'o The rationale
behind the application of strict tort liability and negligence theo-
ries to product cases involving property damage was succinctly
stated by Chief Justice Traynor: "Physical injury to property is so
akin to personal injury that there is no reason to distinguish
them."'"
The courts today are in general agreement that damage to prop-
erty caused by defective products is recoverable under negligence
2. See infra notes 115-44 and accompanying text.
3. See infira notes 145-79 and accompanying text.
4. See, e.g., Prosser, The Assault Upon The Citadel (Strict Liability To The Consumer), 69
YALE LJ. 1099 (1960) (hereinafter cited as Prosser, The Assault); Prosser, The Fall of the
Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50 MINN. L. REV. 791 (1966) (hereinafter cited as
Prosser, The Fall); Traynor, The Ways And Meanings Of Defective Products And Strict Liability,
32 TENN. L. REv. 363 (1965); Wade, StriCt Tort Liability Of Manufacturers, 19 Sw. L.J. 5
(1965).
5. 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
6. See Prosser, The Assault, supra note 4, at 1100 n.9.
7. 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
8. See, e.g., Simpson v. Logan Motor Co., 192 A.2d 122 (D.C. 1963); State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Anderson-Weber, Inc., 252 Iowa 1289, 110 N.W.2d 449 (1961);
Morrow v. Caloric Appliance Corp., 372 S.W.2d 41 (Mo. 1963).
9. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 101, at 665 (4th ed. 1971);
Prosser, The Fall, supra note 4, at 820-23.
10. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment d (1965).
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and strict liablity theories.' 2 Not all damage to property, however,
is recoverable under negligence or strict liability theory in most
jurisdictions. The courts have generally held that damage consti-
tuting "economic loss" is not recoverable under these theories.'3
The key question is what types of damage to property are consid-
ered "economic," and therefore not recoverable.
The line between non-recoverable economic loss and recover-
able property damage is not easy to draw. The courts have had
difficulty defining "economic loss" in a manner which preserves
the warranty concepts embodied in the Uniform Commercial
Code as well as the tort concepts of negligence and strict liability.'
4
12. Dean Prosser stated:
There can be no doubt that the seller's liability for negligence covers any
kind of physical harm, including not only personal injuries, but also property
damage to the defective chattel itself, as where an automobile is wrecked by
reason of its own bad brakes, as well as damage to any other property in the
vicinity. But where there is no accident, and no physical damage, and the only
loss is a pecuniary one, through loss of the value or use of the thing sold, or the
cost of repairing it, the courts have adhered to the rule, to be encountered later,
that purely economic interests are not entitled to protection against mere negli-
gence, and so have denied the recovery.
• . . With the extension of the strict liability beyond food, and in particular
to products likely to cause harm only to property, such as animal food, physical
harm to property began to be included; and there is now general agreement that
there may be recovery not only for damage to the defective chattel itself, or to
other products made from it, but also to other property in the vicinity, as where
a building is wrecked by the explosion of a gasoline stove.
W. PROSSER, supra note 9, § 101, at 665-66 (footnotes omitted). See also infra Appendices
A and B.
13. See, e.g., Pennsylvania Glass Sand Corp. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 652 F.2d 1165
(3d Cir. 1981) (applying Pennsylvania law); Moorman Mfg. Co. v. National Tank Co., 91
Ill. 2d 69, 435 N.E.2d 443 (1982); Clark v. International Harvester Co., 99 Idaho 326, 581
P.2d 784 (1978).
14. Dean Prosser has succinctly defined the theoretical difference between tort actions
and contract actions as follows:
The fundamental difference between tort and contract lies in the nature of
the interests protected. Tort actions are created to protect the interest in free-
dom from various kinds of harm. The duties of conduct which give rise to them
are imposed by law, and are based primarily upon social policy, and not neces-
sarily upon the will or intention of the parties. They may be owed to all those
within the range of harm, or to some considerable class of people. Contract ac-
tions are created to protect the interests in having promises performed. Contract
obligations are imposed because of conduct of the parties manifesting consent,
and are owed only to the specific individuals named in the contract.
W. PROSSER, u.pra note 9, § 92, at 613 (footnotes omitted).
The difficulty the courts have had in defining recoverable property damage is high-
lighted by comparing the majority and concurring opinions in Seely v. White Motor Co.,
63 Cal. 2d 9, 403 P.2d 145, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17 (1965); the majority and dissenting opinions
in Hawkins Constr. Co. v. Matthews Co., 190 Neb. 546, 209 N.W.2d 643 (1973); the ma-
jority and concurring opinions in Moorman Mfg. Co. v. National Tank Co., 91 111. 2d 69,
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To classify a certain type of loss as "economic," however, is to pre-
determine its recoverability in negligence or strict liability.
For the purposes of this discussion, "economic losses" are those
losses resulting from the product's inability to perform its intended
function because of defects within it. "Economic loss" results from
defects in the quality of the product which cause damage. Losses
caused by non-qualitative defects are "non-economic." These defi-
nitions have strong, although not uniform, support in the cases.' 5
III. DAMAGES ARISING FROM AN INJURY TO THE PRODUCT
ITSELF
A. Introduction
The Restatement is silent on the question of whether damages re-
coverable for injury to property under section 402A are limited to
damage to other property or include damage to the product it-
self.16 Two 1965 cases, Santor v. A & M Karagheusian, Inc. 17 and Seely
v. White Motor Co., 18 analyzed the question of the type of damage
to the product that was recoverable in tort and reached opposite
conclusions. '9
In Santor, plaintiff purchased carpeting manufactured by de-
435 N.E.2d 443 (1982); and the majority and dissenting opinions in National Crane Corp.
v. Ohio Steel Tube Co., 213 Neb. 782, 332 N.W.2d 39 (1983).
In each of these cases, the court struggled to reach a definition of "economic loss"
which would allow an injured plaintiff to recover in those situations where the defective
product created an unreasonable risk of harm, but to restrict an injured plaintiff's recov-
ery only to those situations, in order to avoid infringing on the legislatively adopted princi-
ples embodied in the Uniform Commercial Code.
15. See, e.g., Mercer v. Long Mfg. N.C., Inc., 665 F.2d 61, 68-70 (5th Cir. 1982) (court
allowed plaintiff to recover for damage to his peanut crop caused by an allegedly defective
combine); Rocky Mountain Helicopters, Inc. v. Bell Helicopter-Co., 491 F. Supp. 611,
621-22 (N.D. Tex. 1979) (court refused to allow plaintiff to recover for property damage to
a helicopter which crashed because of an alleged defect within it); Wuench v. Ford Motor
Co., 104 Ill. App. 3d 317, 321, 432 N.E.2d 969, 972 (1982) (court concluded that plaintiff
merely sustained a loss of the benefit of his bargain when the axle in plaintiff's car broke
off, causing the car to overturn, damaging it and injuring plaintiff); see also infta Appendi-
ces A, B and C.
16. Comment d to section 402A mentions property damage, as does section 402A
itself, but does not discuss whether recoverable property damage is limited to other prop-
erty, or includes damage to the product itself. The illustrations given by the Committee
deal only with situations involving damage to property other than the product itself.
17. 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965).
18. 63 Cal. 2d 9, 403 P.2d 145, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17 (1965).
19. See Apel, Stnct Liabilty: Recovery Of "&onomic" Loss, 13 IDAHO L. REV. 29 (1976);
Franklin, When Worlds Collide: Liabiliy Theon'zs and Dirclainers in Defective-Product Cases, 18
STAN. L. REV. 974 (1966); Ribstein, Guidelines for Deciding Product Economic Loss Cases, 29
Mercer L Rev. 493 (1978); Note, Economic Losses and Strict Product Liability.- A Record ofJudical
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fendant from a retailer, which was represented to be Grade No. 1
carpeting, but which had an unacceptable line across it due to a
manufacturing defect. After plaintiff learned the retailer had gone
out of business, plaintiff brought an action against the defendant
manufacturer under the theories of breach of implied warranty
and strict products liability, seeking recovery of the cost of the car-
pet. The New Jersey Supreme Court upheld the judgment against
defendant on the theory of implied warranty of merchantability
notwithstanding the lack of privity between plaintiff and the man-
ufacturer. 20 The court also noted that: "[i]t seems important to
observe, however, that the manufacturer's liability may be cast in
simpler form," and allowed plaintiff to recover under strict liabil-
ity.21 The court defined a "defective" product as one not reason-
ably fit for the ordinary purpose for which it was sold or used,
22
and allowed plaintiff to recover for the carpet's failure to meet
plaintiff's economic expectations, even though the carpeting itself
did not pose an "unreasonable risk of harm" to the plaintiff or to
his property.23 Under the theory of Santor, as long as a product is
not reasonably fit for its intended purpose, recovery can be had
under strict liability even though the product is not unreasonably
dangerous.
A contrary view was expressed by Chief Justice Traynor in Seey
v. White Motor Co., 2 4 decided four months after Santor. Plaintiff
purchased a truck manufactured by defendant for use in his
heavy-duty, over-the-road hauling business. Upon receipt of the
vehicle, plaintiff found that the truck "galloped" because of a de-
fect in its suspension system.25 In addition, on one occasion the
brakes on the truck failed, causing the truck to overturn. After
defendant made several unsuccessful attempts to repair the gallop-
ing, plaintiff ceased making payments on the truck, and brought
an action for the money he had paid, for lost profits because of the
galloping, and for damages arising out of the rollover. The trial
court entered judgment in plaintiff's favor on its breach of war-
ranty claim, but denied plaintiff recovery for the damages arising
Confision Between Contract and Tort, 54 NOTRE DAME LAW. 118 (1978); see also Speidel,
Products Liability, Economic Loss And The UCC, 40 TENN. L. REV. 309 (1973).
20. 44 N.J. at 63, 207 A.2d at 310-11.
21. Id at 63, 207 A.2d at 311.
22. Id
23. Id at 67, 207 A.2d at 313.
24. 63 Cal. 2d 9, 403 P.2d 145, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17 (1965).
25. Id at 12, 403 P.2d at 147, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 19.
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out of the accident, finding that plaintiff had failed to meet his
burden of proof that a defect caused the accident.
26
The California Supreme Court affirmed the judgment in favor
of plaintiff on the warranty claim. The court went on, however, to
reject plaintiff's contention that he could also recover under the
theory of strict liability in tort. 27 Justice Traynor pointed out that
tort law does not impose a blanket obligation on the seller of a
product to warrant the performance of a product to the level ex-
pected by the buyer unless the seller so agrees. 28 Tort law does
impose an obligation on a seller to design products to a level of
safety sufficient to prevent an unreasonable risk of harm to the
user or consumer or to his property.29 Therefore, the California
Supreme Court held that tort law will provide a remedy for the
user or consumer who is injured by virtue of an unreasonably dan-
gerous defect in a product-a risk tort law intends to prevent-
although tort law will not provide a remedy to a buyer who is
damaged because the product fails to meet his economic expecta-
tions. 30 Had plaintiff been able to prove that a defect in the truck
caused the rollover, the court would have allowed recovery for
damage to the product itself caused by the unreasonably danger-
ous defect.
3'
26. Id at 13, 403 P.2d at 148, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 20.
27. Id. at 15, 403 P.2d at 149, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 21.
28. Id. at 18, 403 P.2d at 151, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 23.
29. Id As another court noted: "[C]ontract law is largely inapposite to the problem
of hazardous defects, because purchasers are not expected to bargain for a safe product-
they have a right to such a purchase correlative to the manufacturer's duty to provide safe
equipment." Pennsylvania Glass Sand Corp. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 652 F.2d 1165,
1175 (3d Cir. 1981).
30. 63 Cal. 2d at 18, 403 P.2d at 151, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 23. Justice Traynor stated:
The distinction that the law has drawn between tort recovery for physical inju-
ries and warranty recovery for economic loss is not arbitrary and does not rest on
the "luck" of one plaintiff in having an accident causing physical injury. The
distinction rests, rather, on an understanding of the nature of the responsibility a
manufacturer must undertake in distributing his products. He can appropri-
ately be held liable for physical injuries caused by defects by requiring his goods
to match a standard of safety defined in terms of conditions that create unrea-
sonable risks of harm. He cannot be held for the level of performance of his
products in the consumer's business unless he agrees that the product was
designed to meet the consumer's demands. A consumer should not be charged at
the will of the manufacturer with bearing the risk of physical injury when he
buys a product on the market. He can, however, be fairly charged with the risk
that the product will not match his economic expectations unless the manufac-
turer agrees that it will.
Id.
31. Id. at 19, 403 P.2d at 152, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 24. See also Traynor, supra note 4, at
1983]
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Santor and Seely are the two most frequently cited cases in any
discussion of the right to recover damages for injury to the product
itself. Seely represents the majority rule, denying recovery for losses
caused by the product's failure to meet the buyer's expectations
because of qualitative defects, but allowing recovery for injury to
the product caused by unreasonably dangerous defects. 32 Santor
represents the minority view, allowing recovery for all damages
caused by a defective product, whether or not the product is un-
reasonably dangerous.
33
B. Seely and its Progeny
Although the principle set forth in Seely is relatively easy to
state, the courts have had difficulty distinguishing recoverable
damages caused by unreasonably dangerous defects in a product
from non-recoverable damages caused by qualitative defects in a
product. 34 The courts have generally looked to the circumstances
surrounding the claim to determine whether the injury is the result
of a defect which poses an unreasonable risk of harm to the user or
consumer or to his property. 35 When the damages are caused by
such a risk,36 recovery is allowed. When the damages result from
32. See generally 2 L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 16A[4][k]
(Aug. 1982 & Supp. 1983); 1 R. HURSCH & H. BAILEY, AMERICAN LAW OF PRODUCTS
LIABILITY §§ 4:22-:23 (2d ed. 1974 & Supp. 1982).
33. See L. FRUME & M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 32.
34. Compare Blagg v. Fred Hunt Co., 272 Ark. 185, 612 S.W.2d 321 (1981) (court
expressly adopted the Santor theory in a case involving a claim that a carpet pad gave off
fumes of formaldehyde and had to be replaced) with Berkeley Pump Co. v. Reed-Joseph
Land Co., 279 Ark. 384, 653 S.W.2d 128 (1983) (court expressly required that the defec-
tive product be unreasonably dangerous to sustain a recovery in strict liability); Shields v.
Morton Chem. Co., 95 Idaho 674, 518 P.2d 857 (1974) (Idaho Supreme Court adopted
section 402A of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS in a case involving a defective
pesticide which damaged seed beans, suggesting plaintiff could recover in tort for the
damage to the beans) and Salmon Rivers Sportsman Camps, Inc. v. Cessna Aircraft Co.,
97 Idaho 348, 544 P.2d 306 (1975) (court, in dicta, suggested that economic losses were
recoverable in tort) with Clark v. International Harvester Co., 99 Idaho 326, 581 P.2d 784
(1978) (court adopted the reasoning of Seely and rejected plaintiff's claim for economic
losses in negligence); compare also Star Furniture Co. v. Pulaski Furniture Co., 297 S.E.2d
854 (W. Va. 1982) and Cloud v. Kit Mfg. Co., 563 P.2d 247 (Alaska 1978) with Superwood
Corp. v. Siempelkamp Corp., 311 N.W.2d 159 (Minn. 1981) and Hawkins Constr. Co. v.
Matthews Co., 190 Neb. 546, 209 N.W.2d 643 (1973), overruled, National Crane Corp. v.
Ohio Steel Tube Co., 213 Neb. 782, 332 N.W.2d 39 (1983).
35. See, e.g., Pennsylvania Glass Sand Corp. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 652 F.2d 1165
(3d Cir. 1981). The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A uses the term "user or
consumer" in order to emphasize that privity need not exist between a seller and the
injured party.
36. See Cloud v. Kit Mfg. Co., 563 P.2d 248 (Alaska 1977).
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deterioration, internal breakage, or other qualitative defects, re-
covery is denied.
37
For example, the Alaska Supreme Court denied recovery for de-
fects in a mobile home that made it a "lemon" but were not unrea-
sonably dangerous,38 but allowed recovery when the polyurethane
foam rug padding in a mobile home ignited, destroying the mobile
home and its contents.3 9 The court distinguished the "lemon"
from the unreasonably dangerous defect on the ground that plain-
tiffs were deprived of more than merely the benefit of their bargain
because the unreasonably dangerous defects caused a sudden and
calamitous injury to the product itself.4°
The Alaska Supreme Court further refined the sudden and ca-
lamitous test in Northern Power & Engineen'ng Corp. v. Caterpillar Trac-
tor Co. 41 In denying plaintiff recovery for damage to a Caterpillar
tractor containing a defective low oil pressure shut-down system
which caused the engine to seize, the court determined that the
right to recover under negligence and strict liability ought to be
determined by referring to the policies supporting the application
of tort law.42 Because strict liability was intended to allow recov-
ery for damage caused by defective and unreasonably dangerous
products, strict liability can only be used in those situations where
the loss is the proximate result of a dangerous defect in a product,
occurring under circumstances which make the product danger-
ous. Plaintiffs who cannot meet the unreasonably dangerous test
are relegated to a recovery under contract or warranty theory,
even though the damage may have been caused by an "accident"
in the broad sense.43
37. See Northern Power & Eng'g Corp. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 623 P.2d 324
(Alaska 1981). The distinction between an "accident" and deterioration is based in part
on the analysis found in Note, Economic Loss in Products LiabilityJunsprudence, 66 COLUM. L.
REV. 917 (1966).
38. Morrow v. New Moon Homes, Inc., 548 P.2d 279 (Alaska 1976). The mobile
home contained various defects in the wall paneling, roof, light fixtures, and walls. Id at
282.
39. Cloud v. Kit Mfg. Co., 563 P.2d 248 (Alaska 1977).
40. Id at 251.
41. 623 P.2d 324 (Alaska 1981).
42. Id at 328-29.
43. In Shooshanian v. Wagner, 672 P.2d 455 (Alaska 1983), the Alaska Supreme
Court reaffirmed the Northern Power dangerousness test, holding that the critical test in
determining whether damages for an injury to property are recoverable in tort is
(1) whether the product is dangerously defective and (2) whether the dangerous defect
caused the property damage. Id at 464. See Ribstein, supra note 19, at 500-01 for a cri-
tique of the dangerous-nondangerous approach to resolving the question of the recover-
ability of damages for an injury to the product itself.
1983]
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A similar distinction was drawn in Oregon, where the supreme
court denied recovery to a plaintiff whose chickens failed to lay
eggs because of an apparent defect in the chicken feed,44 and
where a tractor failed to perform to the level expected by the
plaintiff,45 but allowed recovery for property damage to a truck
resulting from a defect in the brakes.46 The court justified the dis-
tinction it drew by relying on the policies supporting the adoption
of strict liability, distinguishing the disappointed buyers in the first
two cases from the endangered one in the third.
47
In Moorman Manufacturing Co. v. National Tank Co., 48 Illinois
adopted a rule based not on the existence of physical harm, but
rather on the nature of the damage viewed from the perspective of
the interests to be protected by tort law.49 The Illinois Supreme
Court refused to allow recovery in negligence or strict liability for
damage to a grain storage bin which cracked, allowing the grain
inside to spill onto the ground. Recognizing that to allow recovery
for benefit of the bargain losses under tort theory would essentially
emasculate the warranty provisions of the Uniform Commercial
Code, the court fashioned a rule that allows recovery for damage
to property only when the plaintiff establishes that the product
was defective and unreasonably dangerous.50 Similarly, the court
refused to allow recovery in negligence for economic losses result-
ing from qualitative defects in the product, relegating the con-
sumer to recovery in contract.51  Although not specifically /
expressed in the Moorman opinion, Illinois will apparently allow
recovery for damages resulting from an injury to the product itself
under both negligence and strict liability theories. 52
44. Brown v. Western Farmers Ass'n, 268 Or. 470, 521 P.2d 537 (1974).
45. Price v. Gatlin, 241 Or. 315, 405 P.2d 502 (1965).
46. Russell v. Ford Motor Co., 281 Or. 587, 575 P.2d 1383 (1978).
47. The Russell court held:
The loss must be a consequence of the kind of danger and occur under the kind
of circumstances, "accidental" or not, that made the condition of the product a
basis for strict liability. This distinguishes such a loss from economic losses due
only to the poor performance or the reduced resale value of a defective, even a
dangerously defective, product.
281 Or. at 595, 575 P.2d at 1387.
48. 91 111. 2d 69, 435 N.E.2d 443 (1982), rev'g, 92 Ill. App. 3d 136, 414 N.E.2d 1302
(1980).
49. Id at 95, 435 N.E.2d at 455 (Simon, J., concurring specially).
50. 91 111. 2d at 79-80, 435 N.E.2d at 448.
51. Id. at 85-86, 435 N.E.2d at 450.
52. The Moorman court relies on the Third Circuit's decision in Pennsylvania Glass
Sand Corp. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 652 F.2d 1165 (3d Cir. 1981), which explicitly
allows the recovery of damages for injury to the product itself caused by an unreasonably
[Vol. 9
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The New York Court of Appeals has recently resolved a dispute
between two departments of the Appellate Division, and has
joined the majority of jurisdictions in adopting the approach taken
in Seey. In John R. Dudley Construction, Inc. v. Droll Manufacturing
Co., 53 the Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court,
Fourth Department, followed the rationale of Seely and allowed
recovery for damage to a crane which collapsed because bolts in its
turntable failed. Noting that plaintiff was not attempting to re-
cover the difference in the value of the crane with and without the
defective bolts, but rather was seeking damages caused by an un-
reasonably dangerous defect, the court found it unnecessary to
reach the question of the applicability of the Santor theory in New
York.54 In Schiavone Construction Co. v. Elgood Mayo Corp.,55 however,
the Appellate Division, First Department, allowed plaintiff to re-
cover damage due to a qualitative defect in a truck hoist which
prevented the truck from performing its intended function. Rely-
ing on the New York Court of Appeals decision in Randy Knitwear,
Inc. v. American Cyanamid Co.,56 which allowed recovery in strict lia-
bility for a defect in a resin that allowed the fabric in which it was
incorporated to shrink,57 the court allowed plaintiff to amend its
complaint to allege a cause of action in strict liability.58 The New
York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division's decision
in Schiavone, 59 choosing to adopt the dissenting opinion of Justice
Silverman, 6° allowing recovery for damage to the product itself
only when the product is unreasonably dangerous to persons or
property.
6'
dangerous defect. 652 F.2d at 1174-75. Although the Moorman court discusses the right to
recover for damage to other property under negligence and strict liability theories, the
court's reliance on Pennsylvan'a Glass Sand supports the proposition that Illinois will allow
recovery of damages for injury to the product itself under both negligence and strict liabil-
ity theories. The Illinois Court of Appeals so held in Vaughn v. General Motors Corp.,
1.18 Ill. App. 3d 201, 454 N.E.2d 740 (1983).
53. 66 A.D.2d 368, 412 N.Y.S.2d 512 (1979).
54. Id at 374, 412 N.Y.S.2d at 514.
55. 81 A.D.2d 221, 439 N.Y.S.2d 933 (1981).
56. 11 N.Y.2d 5, 181 N.E.2d 399 (1962).
57. The Randy Knitwear court held: "We perceive no warrant for holding-as [Ameri-
can Cyanamid] urges--that strict liability should not here be imposed because the defect
involved, fabric shrinkage, is not likely to cause personal harm or injury." 11 N.Y.2d at
15, 181 N.E.2d at 403-04.
58. 81 A.D.2d at 227, 439 N.Y.S.2d at 937.
59. 56 N.Y.2d 667, 436 N.E.2d 1322, 451 N.Y.S.2d 720 (1982).
60. 81 A.D.2d at 227, 439 N.Y.S.2d at 937.
61. 56 N.Y.2d at 668, 436 N.E.2d at 1323, 451 N.Y.S.2d at 721; see also County of
Westchester v. General Motors Corp., 555 F. Supp. 290 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (court refused to
1983]
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In Vulcan Materials Co. v. Dritlech, Inc., 62 the Georgia Supreme
Court clarified two Georgia Court of Appeals decisions63 involving
actions for recovery for damage to the product itself. Vulcan Materi-
als came before the Georgia Supreme Court pursuant to an order
of certification issued by the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals.
64
The facts set forth by the supreme court indicate that a rotary
blast hole drilling machine burst into flames and was destroyed
because a cast iron bushing in the machine's compressor system
fractured and released a spray of hydraulic fluid that ignited. The
operator escaped the fire without injury, and there was no damage
to property other than the drill. 65 The court reviewed the signifi-
cant decisions from other jurisdictions66 in order to establish a de-
finitive rule to be applied in Georgia in actions for damage to a
product itself. The court analyzed the policies underlying war-
ranty and tort law, and concluded that a plaintiff could recover for
damage to the product itself caused by a defect which poses an
unreasonable risk of harm to persons or property.
67
C. Santor and its Progeny
Several states, following the rationale of Santor, allow recovery
under negligence and strict liability theories for damages resulting
from qualitative defects in a product that is not unreasonably dan-
gerous. For example, in Blagg v. Fred Hunt Co., 68 plaintiff sought
allow recovery of damages in tort when air-conditioning units on several buses manufac-
tured by defendant failed to operate properly, concluding that the defects were not unrea-
sonably dangerous to persons or other property, but simply failed to perform their
intended function).
62. 251 Ga. 383, 306 S.E.2d 253 (1983).
63. Long Mfg. N.C. Inc. v. Grady Tractor Co., 140 Ga. App. 320, 231 S.E.2d 105
(1976); Long v. Jim Letts Oldsmobile, Inc., 135 Ga. App. 293, 217 S.E.2d 602 (1975).
64. 251 Ga. at -, 306 S.E.2d at 254.
65. Id. at __, 306 S.E.2d at 254.
66. Pennsylvania Glass Sand Corp. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 652 F.2d 1165 (3d Cir.
1981); Cloud v. Kit Mfg. Co., 563 P.2d 248 (Alaska 1977); Seely v. White Motor Co., 64
Cal. 2d 9, 403 P.2d 145, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17 (1965).
67. The court held:
Thus, the certified questions are answered as follows: (1) Under Georgia law,
there is an accident exception to the general rule that an action in negligence
does not lie absent personal injury or damage to property other than to the alleg-
edly defective product. (2) An "accident" should be defined as a sudden and
calamitous event which, although it may only cause damage to the defective
product itself, poses an unreasonable risk of injury to other persons or property.
251 Ga. at __, 306 S.E.2d at 257.
68. 272 Ark. 185, 612 S.W.2d 321 (1981). But see Berkeley Pump Co. v. Reed-Joseph
Land Co., 279 Ark. 384, 653 S.W.2d 128 (1983). In Berkeley Pump, the court, purporting to
clarify Blagg, held that a product must be unreasonably dangerous to sustain recovery in
[Vol. 9
12
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 9, Iss. 1 [1983], Art. 1
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol9/iss1/1
PROPERTY DAMAGE
recovery for the cost of replacing a carpet and pad that emitted
strong odors and fumes of formaldehyde.69  The Arkansas
Supreme Court, noting that the Arkansas strict liability statute
70
broadened the provisions of section 402A of the Restatement (Second)
of Torts, 7' chose to adopt the reasoning of Santor and refused to
dismiss plaintiffs strict liability claim. 72 The court did not discuss
whether the defect was unreasonably dangerous. Similarly, in
Thompson v. Nebraska Mobile Homes Corp., 73 the Montana Supreme
Court reversed the district court's dismissal of plaintiffs claim in
strict liability in tort for qualitative defects in a mobile home
purchased from defendant. 74 The court adopted the reasoning of
Santor, 75 and allowed plaintiff to recover for qualitative defects in
strict liability.
76
Ohio allows recovery for qualitative defects in strict liability,
77
but not in negligence. 78 The basis for such a recovery began with
Ingh's v. American Motors Corp., 79 which rejected plaintiff's right to
recover under a negligence theory for the diminution in the value
of an automobile due to qualitative defects. 80 Relying on Santor,
the court fashioned a non-privity express warranty theory which
allowed plaintiff to recover the same damages. Subsequently, in
Iacono v. Anderson Concrete Corp.," I plaintiff sought recovery from de-
fendant for damage to a concrete driveway installed by defendant
which pitted after installation because defendant used a type of
aggregate in the concrete mix not suited for outdoor application.
The Ohio Supreme Court allowed plaintiff to recover the cost of
replacing the driveway, concluding that the tort theory of breach
of implied warranty could be used to recover for damage confined
strict liability. Id. at -, 653 S.W.2d at 131. Although the court purported to rely on the
theory of Santor in Berkeley Pump, it actually adopted the theory of Seely. Id. at -, 653
S.W.2d at 131. It is clear that Arkansas follows Seely not Santor.
69. Id. at 185-86, 612 S.W.2d at 322.
70. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 85-2-318.2 (Supp. 1981).
71. 272 Ark. at 188, 612 S.W.2d at 323.
72. Id at 190, 612 S.W.2d at 324.
73. - Mont. -, 647 P.2d 334 (1982).
74. Id. at __ 647 P.2d at 337.
75. Id
76. Id at -, 647 P.2d at 338.
77. Mead Corp. v. Allendale Mut. Ins. Co., 465 F. Supp. 355 (N.D. Ohio 1979).
78. Inglis v. American Motors Corp., 3 Ohio St. 2d 132, 209 N.E.2d 583 (1965).
79. Id
80. Id. at 140-41, 209 N.E.2d at 588.
81. 42 Ohio St. 2d 88, 326 N.E.2d 267 (1975).
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solely to the product.8 2
In Mead Corp. v. Allendale Mutual Insurance Co., 83 the Federal Dis-
trict Court for the Northern District of Ohio, relying on Inghs and
Iacono, allowed plaintiff to recover in strict liability for damages
arising out of the failure of a generator used by plaintiff in its busi-
ness. The court recognized that the losses sustained were economic
in nature because they were caused by a qualitative defect in the
generator, but held that Ohio allowed such recovery.84 The court
pointed out, however, that recovery was available in strict liability
only, not in negligence.
8 5
Both Michigan and Wisconsin have adopted a similar ap-
proach. In Cova v. Harley Davidson Motor Co., 8 6 the Michigan Court
of Appeals allowed plaintiff to recover the cost of repairing twelve
golf carts containing various defects in their ignition systems, al-
beit under a tort theory of breach of implied warranty in the ab-
sence of privity.8 7 Wisconsin allowed a plaintiff to recover the cost
of replacing a defective roof caused by a qualitative defect in the
City of LaCrosse v. Schubert, Schroeder & Associates, Inc., 88 following the
policy argument of Santor. 89
D. Texas and Minnesota
Texas is the only state to expressly refuse to allow recovery of
damages for injury to the product itself, even if the injury results
from an unreasonably dangerous defect in the product. 90 In Nobil-
82. The tort theory of breach of implied warranty adopted by the court is virtually
identical to the theory of strict liability in tort. The court, therefore, allowed recovery for
damages caused by a qualitative defect in the product without regard to the requirement
of unreasonable danger. Id. at 93, 326 N.E.2d at 271.
83. 465 F. Supp. 355 (N.D. Ohio 1979).
84. Id. at 366.
85. Id at 366-67.
86. 26 Mich. App. 602, 182 N.W.2d 800 (1970).
87. Id. at 608-09, 182 N.W.2d at 804. The breach of implied warranty theory
adopted by the court is identical to the general principles of strict liability in tort without
the requirement of an unreasonably dangerous defect. See also Gauthier v. Mayo, 77
Mich. App. 513, 258 N.W.2d 748 (1977).
88. 72 Wis. 2d 38, 240 N.W.2d 124 (1976).
89. Id. at 45, 240 N.W.2d at 127. The court relied on Air Prods. & Chems., Inc. v.
Fairbanks Morse, Inc., 58 Wis. 2d 193, 206 N.W.2d 414 (1973), in determining the ques-
tion under Wisconsin law. In Air Products, the Wisconsin court, applying Pennsylvania
law, allowed the recovery of damages for qualitative defects in a product. See 72 Wis. 2d
at 45, 240 N.W.2d at 127.
90. Delaware has refused to allow recovery in strict liability for either personal injury
or property damage caused by a defective product, holding that the legislature pre-
[Vol. 9
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ity Homes of Texas, Inc. v. Shivers, 91 plaintiff sought to recover the
diminution in value of a mobile home due to qualitative defects
under the theories of negligence and strict liability. 92 The Texas
Supreme Court followed the rationale of Seely, and refused to al-
low recovery because the jury had determined that no unreasona-
bly dangerous defect existed. 93  In Mid Continent Aircraft Corp. v.
Curry County Spraying Service, Inc., 94 plaintiff sought recovery of dam-
ages when a defect in the engine of its crop-dusting plane forced
the pilot to crash land on a rough country road, seriously damag-
ing the airplane.9 5 Plaintiff sought to distinguish this factual cir-
cumstance from that in Nobility Homes, pointing out the difference
between a qualitative defect and an unreasonably dangerous prod-
uct. 96 After reviewing the authorities on both sides of the ques-
tion, 97 the Texas Supreme Court adopted the policy argument of
Dean Keeton,98 classified the damage to the plane as the loss of the
benefit of the bargain, and denied plaintiff recovery under strict
liability theory, notwithstanding the jury's decision that the defect
in the engine was unreasonably dangerous. 99
In Signal Oil & Gas Co. v. Universal Oil Products, 100 the Texas
Supreme Court allowed recovery of damage to the product itself
empted the imposition of strict tort liability by adopting the Uniform Commercial Code.
Cline v. Prowler Indus. of Md., Inc., 418 A.2d 968 (Del. 1980).
91. 557 S.W.2d 77 (Tex. 1977).
92. See id. at 77-78.
93. Id. at 79-80. The court's ruling is limited to plaintiff's claim under a theory of
strict liability in tort. The trial judge found Nobility's negligence proximately caused
Shiver's damages. Nobility attacked that decision in the court of civil appeals without
success. Nobility failed to challenge the court of appeals' ruling before the Texas Supreme
Court, compelling the supreme court to affirm the judgment in favor of Shivers in negli-
gence. Id. at 83.
94. 572 S.W.2d 308 (Tex. 1978).
95. See id. at 310.
96. Id at 311.
97. Id at 311-12. As Justice Pope points out in his dissent, the authorities relied on
by the majority do not support the position adopted. 572 S.W.2d at 318 (Pope, J.,
dissenting).
98. 572 S.W.2d at 312. Dean Keeton argued: "'A damaging event that harms only
the product should be treated as irrelevant to policy considerations directing liability
placement in tort. Consequently, if a defect causes damage limited solely to the property,
recovery should be available, if at all, on a contract-warranty theory.' " Id (quoting Kee-
ton, Annual Survey of Texas Law on Torts, 32 Sw. L.J. 1, 5 (1978)).
99. Id at 310. Justice Pope argued in dissent that, although economic loss is different
from the physical harm necessary to sustain an action under a theory of strict liability in
tort, this case involved physical harm, not economic loss. Id at 313, 317-19 (Pope, J.,
dissenting).
100. 572 S.W.2d 320 (Tex. 1978).
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when a defect in the product caused a fire in plaintiff's plant, dam-
aging other property in addition to the product itself. 10 In a con-
curring opinion, Justice Pope, author of the dissent in Mid
Conttnent, questioned the distinction the court drew between the
defect in Mid Coni'nent and that in Signal O, arguing that the re-
sult in each case should be the same because there was no legal or
logical rationale for distinguishing the cases. ' 0
2
The law of Minnesota is unclear as to the recoverability of dam-
ages for an injury to the product itself. The uncertainty arises
from the Minnesota Supreme Court's decision in Superwood Corp. v.
Siempelkamp Corp. 103 Superwood came before the Minnesota
Supreme Court pursuant to an order for certification of an unset-
tled question of state law issued by the United States District
Court for the District of Minnesota.' °4 The questions certified by
the district court dealt with the plaintiff's right to recover damages
for an injury to the product itself under negligence and strict lia-
bility theories.10 5 Plaintiff sought recovery for the cost of repairing
a defective press which failed after twenty-one years of use. Plain-
tiff also sought recovery of lost profits and increased costs resulting
from the inability to use the damaged press during repairs.
10 6
Noting the absence of controlling Minnesota precedent, the
101. See id. at 325. The court held:
In the instant case Signal has alleged property damages in the form of damages
to the product itself, as wellas to other surround'ngproperty. . . Where such collat-
eral property damage exists in addition to damage to the product itself, recovery
for such damages are recoverable [sic] under Section 402A of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts as damage to property . . . . To the extent that the product
itself has become part of the accident risk or the tort by causing collateral prop-
erty damage, it is properly considered as part of the property damages, rather
than as economic loss.
Id (emphasis in original).
102. Justice Pope argued:
In Signal Oil, the damage to the plant that it bought could be sought in a strict
liability suit; in Mid Continent the damage to the airplane it sold cannot be sought
in a strict liability suit. The holdings are inconsistent and portend problems that
could be avoided by adhering to the criteria stated in section 402A.
572 S.W.2d at 332 (Pope, J., concurring).
The Fifth Circuit, attempting to apply the principles of Mid Continent and Signal Oil
in Mercer v. Long Mfg. N.C., Inc., 665 F.2d 61 (5th Cir. 1982), reached the conclusion
that a plaintiff could recover for damage to its peanut crop caused by a defect in a com-
bining machine, but could not recover for damage to the combine itself. Id at 70. The
court apparently ignored the unreasonably dangerous requirements of Mid Continent and
Signal Oil.
103. 311 N.W.2d 159 (Minn. 1981).
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Minnesota Supreme Court reviewed the authorities on both sides
of the question, 0 7 chose to adopt the approach taken by Chief Jus-
tice Traynor in Seely, 108 and denied plaintiff recovery in tort for
the damages it sustained. 0 9 In his dissent, Justice Yetka argued
that the rule announced in Superwood should apply only to plain-
tiff's action in strict liability, not its negligence claim, because
Minnesota had long recognized a plaintiff's right to recover dam-
ages for economic loss if negligence was proven. 110
The uncertainty regarding the scope of the Superwood decision
results by virtue of the status of the case as decided by the Minne-
sota Supreme Court. The questions certified by the district court
were in response to a motion for summary judgment made by de-
fendant. In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the court is
obliged to construe the facts in the light most favorable to the non-
moving party, in this case, the plaintiff. One issue of fact before
the trial court was whether the damage which plaintiff sustained
resulted from an unreasonably dangerous defect in the product."1
For the purposes of the summary judgment motion, the court was
required to assume that plaintiff could prove the product was un-
reasonably dangerous. If the Minnesota Supreme Court's decision
in Superwood is based on the factual assumption that the press was
unreasonably dangerous, then Minnesota follows the Texas theory,
allowing recovery for damage to the product itself only if other
property is damaged or personal injury results.1 2 Such a result is
contrary to the decision in Seely, on which the Minnesota Supreme
Court relied. If the Minnesota Supreme Court did not assume
that the defect in the press was unreasonably dangerous, the opin-
ion in Superwood stands for the proposition that economic loss is not
recoverable in tort in Minnesota, leaving open the question of the
recoverability of damages caused by an unreasonably dangerous
defect. "1
3
107. Id at 161.
108. Id at 161-62.
109. Id at 162.
110. Id at 163 (Yetka, J., dissenting). See also Ellis v. Lindmark, 177 Minn. 390, 225
N.W. 395 (1929); Neiman v. Channellene Oil & Mfg. Co., 112 Minn. 11, 127 N.W. 394
(1910).
111. See Superwood, 311 N.W.2d at 160. But see States Steamship Co. v. Stone Manga-
nese Marine, Ltd., 371 F. Supp. 500, 506 (D.N.J. 1973) (trial court refused to dismiss
plaintiff's complaint in response to defendant's contention that economic loss was in-
volved, holding that the issue of unreasonable danger was a fact issue for the jury).
112. See supra notes 90 to 99 and accompanying text.
113. See Northern States Power Co. v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp., 550 F. Supp.
19831
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E. Summary
The majority of jurisdictions allow recovery of damages for in-
jury to the product itself under negligence and strict liability theo-
ries when the injury is one arising in a factual context which
promotes the policies behind the adoption of negligence and strict
liability, but deny recovery for qualitative defects. A minority of
jurisdictions allow recovery for all types of damages arising from
an injury to a product itself, whether the defects causing the injury
are qualitative or unreasonably dangerous. 1 4 Texas refuses to al-
low recovery when the only damage is to the product itself,
whether the damage results from an unreasonably dangerous de-
fect or a qualitative one. Minnesota's law is unclear as to the
recoverability of damages for injury to the product itself, even
when the damage is caused by an unreasonably dangerous
product.
IV. DAMAGES ARISING FROM INJURY TO OTHER PROPERTY
A. Introduction
Virtually every jurisdiction that has decided the question of the
recoverability of damages resulting from an injury to property
other than the product itself under negligence and strict liability
theories, allows such recovery. The justification supporting recov-
ery, as stated by Justice Traynor in Seely, is that there is no differ-
ence between property damage resulting from an unreasonably
dangerous defect and personal injury resulting from the same un-
reasonably dangerous defect. 1 5 Therefore, there is no reason to
allow recovery in one case but not in the other.
B. Seely Applied
In Star Furniture v. Pulaski Furniture Co., 116 the West Virginia
Supreme Court allowed a plaintiff to recover when a clock mal-
functioned and burned plaintiff's building down. 1 7 In Bombardi v.
Pochel's Appliance & TV Co., 118 the Washington Court of Appeals
allowed plaintiff to recover damage to real and personal property
108 (D. Minn. 1982). The court suggested that Superwood's "import and precedential
value are a topic of debate." Id at 111.
114. See infra Appendix A.
115. See Seey, 63 Cal. App. 2d at 19, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 24, 403 P.2d at 152.
116. 297 S.E.2d 854 (W. Va. 1982).
117. See id at 863.
118. 9 Wash. App. 797, 515 P.2d 540 (1973).
[Vol. 9
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caused by a defect in a television set which ignited and damaged
the premises.' 19 In Hales v. Green Colonial, Inc., 120 the Eighth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals, applying Missouri law, allowed plaintiff to
recover damage to his real property resulting from a fire caused by
a defect in a heater. 121
The mere existence of damage to other property is not, in and of
itself, sufficient to sustain recovery under negligence and strict lia-
bility theories. Several courts have distinguished damage to other
property caused by an unreasonably dangerous defect from dam-
age to other property caused by a qualitative one, allowing recov-
ery in the former case but denying it in the latter. 122 For example,
in Monsanto Agricultural Products Co. v. Edenfild, 123 the court refused
to allow a plaintiff to recover in negligence for damage to plain-
tiff's crop caused by the failure of a herbicide to effectively control
weeds, noting that the damage was caused by the herbicide's inef-
fectiveness, rather than by a defect in the herbicide.12 4 In Purvis .
Consolidated Energy Products Co., 125 the court refused to allow plain-
119. See id at 799, 515 P.2d at 542.
120. 490 F.2d 1015 (8th Cir. 1974).
121. Id at 1022. See also LeSueur Creamery, Inc. v. Haskon, Inc., 660 F.2d 342 (8th
Cir. 1981), cert. dented, 455 U.S. 1019 (1982) (interpreting Minnesota law). But see
Superwood Corp. v. Siempelkamp Corp., 311 N.W.2d 159 (Minn. 1981). The result in
LeSueur Creamery may be consistent with the decision in Superwood because the defect
caused damage to other property.
In Gates Rubber Co. v. Irathane Systems, Inc., 710 F.2d 501 (8th Cir. 1983), the
United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, deciding Minnesota law, reversed
the trial court's dismissal of a claim for damage to other property, holding that Superwood
did not bar an action for damage to property other than the product itself. The court did
not decide whether plaintiff could also recover for damage to the product itself when other
property was damaged.
122. Compare State v. Cook Paint & Varnish Co., 391 F. Supp. 962 (D. Ariz. 1975), cert.
denied, 430 U.S. 915 (1977) (court held defendants not liable where polyurethane foam
installed in plaintiffs' buildings proved flammable and had to be removed, concluding
that plaintiffs simply lost the benefit of their bargain) with Rocky Mountain Fire & Cas.
Co. v. Biddulph Oldsmobile, 131 Ariz. 289,640 P.2d 851 (1982) (court allowed recovery in
strict liability when a mobile home burst into flames within six months of its purchase due
to a defect in its heater). But see Board of Educ. v. United States Gypsum Co., 552 F.
Supp. 855 (D.NJ. 1982) (following the theory of Santor, plaintiff could recover in tort for
the cost of removing asbestos ceiling tiles from several school buildings, because the asbes-
tos tiles posed an unreasonable risk of harm to persons); Shooshanian v. Wagner, 672 P.2d
455 (Alaska 1983) (court, following Seedy, reversed a summary judgment in favor of de-
fendant and allowed plaintiff to maintain his strict liability and negligence claims for the
cost of removing urea formaldehyde insulation that emitted noxious and hazardous fumes,
holding that the insulation was unreasonably dangerous).
123. 426 So. 2d 574 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
124. Id at 576.
125. 674 F.2d 217 (4th Cir. 1982).
19831
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tiff to recover for damage to his tobacco crop caused by a defect in
the ventilating system of a curing barn, pointing out that the de-
fect did not create an unreasonable risk of danger.12 6 The barn
simply failed to perform as plaintiff expected. Similarly, in State v.
Cook Paint & Varnish Co., 127 the court refused to allow a class of
plaintiffs to recover damages caused by the installation of poly-
urethane foam insulation in their buildings, pointing out that
plaintiffs simply failed to obtain the benefit of their bargain in that
the urethane foam failed to meet expected standards of
performance. 128
The difference between recoverable and non-recoverable dam-
age to other property was clearly set forth in Fireman's Fund Ameri-
can Insurance Co. v. Burns Electronic Security Services, Inc. 129 A
subrogated insurer sought to recover approxmately $800,000 it
paid as a result of a burglary of its insured's premises, which were
protected by a burglar alarm system installed and maintained by
defendant. The contract between the insured and the defendant
contained a limitation of liability. In an effort to circumvent the
contractual limitation, plaintiff sued under the theory of strict lia-
bility in tort. The court denied recovery, concluding that the loss
was economic and therefore not recoverable. 30 The court defined
economic loss as the loss of the benefit of the bargain and con-
trasted that loss with a loss that the parties could not reasonably
have contemplated, such as hazards peripheral to the product's in-
tended function.' 3' The court distinguished the situation where a
fire alarm fails to work allowing a building to burn down from the
126. Id at 223. The court stated:
Plaintiff's evidence may have demonstrated that the barns performed their in-
tended task poorly, but it did not establish that they posed a safety hazard. A
showing that the barns caused physical injury to tobacco by failing to cure it
does not establish that the barns were unreasonably dangerous to property ...
Giving the plaintiff the benefit of all favorable inferences, we conclude that it
was an ordinary commercial risk of product ineffectiveness which caused this
loss.
Id.
The court's decision in _'urv is clouded by the court's reliance on a disclaimer of
liability in the contract for sale as an additional basis for denying plaintiff recovery. 674
F.2d at 220-23. See injfa notes 184-96 and accompanying text for a further discussion of
the effectiveness of a disclaimer of liability in a contract for the sale of a product.
127. 391 F. Supp. 962 (D. Ariz. 1975).
128. Id at 971-72.
129. 93 Ill. App. 3d 298, 417 N.E.2d 131 (1980).
130. Id at 301, 417 N.E.2d at 134. Accord Lobianco v. Property Protection, Inc., 292
Pa. Super. 346, 437 A.2d 417 (1981).
131. See 93 I11. App. 3d at 300, 417 N.E.2d at 133.
(Vol. 9
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situation where the fire alarm malfunctions and starts the fire.' 32
The court concluded that the failure of the fire alarm to detect the
fire-its intended function-would not serve as a basis for recovery
in strict liability.13 3  If the fire alarm caused the fire, recovery
would be allowed.
On March 25, 1983, the Nebraska Supreme Court joined the
majority of jurisdictions in allowing recovery for damage to prop-
erty in strict liability, 134 by overruling a prior decision 35 which
held that strict liability was inapplicable in cases involving dam-
age to property only. 136 The plaintiff in National Crane Corp. v. Ohio
Steel Tube Co. purchased steel tubing from defendant which plain-
tiff incorporated into a variety of cranes it manufactured.
137
Plaintiff sold its cranes to customers who reported a variety of fail-
ures due to a defect in the original manufacture of the tubes.
Plaintiff conducted a retrofit program, replacing all the steel tub-
ing sold to plaintiff by defendant, and commenced an action
against defendant for the cost of the retrofit program under the
theories of warranty, negligence, and strict liability. ' 38 The district
court dismissed plaintiff's tort claims, and plaintiff appealed. 
39
The Nebraska Supreme Court analyzed the law of strict liability
as it related to claims for property damage and decided that a
plaintiff injured by an unreasonably dangerous defect in a product
ought to be allowed to recover in tort whether the defect caused
personal injury or property damage.' 40 Plaintiffs who suffer eco-
nomic loss without actual physical harm to person or property are
relegated to recovery in contract or warranty.' 4' The court con-
cluded, however, that the damages plaintiff sought-the cost of
replacing defective tubing supplied by the defendant-constituted
economic loss for which no recovery was available under a tort
theory.' 42 In his dissent, Justice Boslaugh argued that plaintiff's
loss was not economic but recoverable property damage resulting
132. Id
133. See id at 301, 417 N.E.2d at 133.
134. National Crane Corp. v. Ohio Steel Tube Co., 213 Neb. 782, 332 N.W.2d 39
(1983).
135. Hawkins Constr. Co. v. Matthews Co., 190 Neb. 546, 209 N.W.2d 643 (1973).
136. 213 Neb. at 789-90, 332 N.W.2d at 43-44.
137. Id at 783, 332 N.W.2d at 41.
138. Id. at 785, 332 N.W.2d at 42.
139. Id at 785-86, 332 N.W.2d at 42.
140. Id at 786-91, 332 N.W.2d at 42-44.
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The majority of the courts have drawn the same distinction in
connection with the injury to other property as they have with
regard to injury to the product itself. 44 The courts allow recovery
when the damage to other property results from an unreasonably
dangerous defect in the product, but deny recovery when that
damage results from a qualitative defect in the product not rising
to the unreasonably dangerous standard.
V. DAMAGES ARISING FROM Loss OF USE OR INTERRUPTION
OF BUSINESS
The majority of jurisdictions hold that damages for loss of use,
lost profits, and interruption of business caused by a qualitative
defect in a product are not recoverable in negligence or strict lia-
bility, following the rationale of Seely. 145 Many courts that allow
recovery of damages for injury to the product itself or to other
property refuse to allow recovery of damages for interruption of
business or loss of use, holding that such losses are "economic,"
and therefore, not recoverable under Seel. 146 Those states which
follow the Santor theory generally allow recovery for interruption
of business or loss of use damages, even though caused by a quali-
tative defect. 
47
Those states which follow the theory of Seely uniformly deny re-
covery of damages for loss of use or interruption of business result-
ing from a qualitative defect in a product. Clark v. International
Harvester Co. '41 exemplifies the reasoning of the majority position.
In Clark, plaintiff sought recovery of damages in negligence,'
49
when a tractor plaintiff purchased from defendant broke down,
rendering it unusable to plaintiff. 50 In a court trial plaintiff was
143. Id at 794, 332 N.W.2d at 46 (Boslaugh, J., dissenting).
144. See infra Appendix B.
145. See infra Appendix C.
146. See, e.g., Star Furniture Co. v. Pulaski Furniture Co., 297 S.E.2d 854 (W. Va.
1982).
147. The states which follow Santor are Connecticut, Michigan, Montana, New Jersey,
Ohio, and Wisconsin.
148. 99 Idaho 326, 581 P.2d 784 (1978).
149. Id at 329, 581 P.2d at 787.
150. Id at 330-31, 581 P.2d at 788-89.
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awarded damages for loss of profits from which defendant ap-
pealed. 151 The Idaho Supreme Court reversed 52 concluding that
the law of torts does not protect the economic expectations of a
party whose only damage results from a defect in the quality of the
product,15 3  but the law of warranty does. 54  Similarly, in
Beauchamp v. Wilson, 155 the Arizona Court of Appeals denied plain-
tiff recovery for lost profits resulting from a series of qualitative
defects in a truck purchased from defendant.
56
The major problem the courts that follow Seely have faced is
whether damages for lost profits and interruption of business
caused by an unreasonably dangerous defect in a product are
"economic" or "non-economic." In Hales v. Green Colonial, Inc., 157
the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, applying Missouri law, fol-
lowed the theory of Seely and allowed plaintiffs to recover the lost
profits they sustained when a defective heater in their retail store
caught fire and burst into flames, seriously damaging the store.1
5 8
Similarly, in Boone Valley Cooperative Processing Association v. French
Oil Mill Machinery Co., 59 the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Iowa allowed plaintiff to recover for lost prof-
its,160 resulting from an explosion in a soybean processing plant
caused by a defect in the plant.'
6 '
Several states which follow the Seely theory involving damage to
the product itself or damage to other property do not allow recov-
ery of damages for lost profits, ostensibly relying on Seely's defini-
tion of "economic loss," when those damages result from an
unreasonably dangerous defect in a product. In Star Furniture Co. v.
Pulaski Furniture Co., 162 a clock malfunctioned and started a fire
that severely damaged plaintiffs furniture store. Plaintiff sought
recovery of damages for injury to the clock itself, for injury to
other prQperty, and for the interruption of business due to the fire.
151. Id at 331, 581 P.2d at 789.
152. Id at 336, 581 P.2d at 794.
153. Id. at 335, 581 P.2d at 793.
154. Id at 335-36, 581 P.2d at 793-94.
155. 21 Ariz. App. 14, 515 P.2d 41 (1973).
156. Id at 17-18, 515 P.2d at 44-45.
157. 410 F.2d 1015 (8th Cir. 1974).
158. Id at 1022. The court stated: "Loss of profits by reason of the tortious destruc-
tion of the plaintiffs' business was a foreseeable damage ordinarily cognizable in tort liabil-
ity and therefore we find it to be compensable under Missouri law." Id
159. 383 F. Supp. 606 (N.D. Iowa 1974).
160. Id at 615.
161. Id at 607-08.
162. 297 S.E.2d 854 (W. Va. 1982).
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After reviewing the law of other jurisdictions, the court allowed
recovery of damages for injury to plaintiff's other property 163 and,
in dicta, said that damages for injury to the product itself caused
by an unreasonably dangerous defect were also recoverable.
164
The court refused to allow plaintiff to recover damages for the in-
terruption of its business, equating those damages with a mere loss
of value of the product due to a qualitative defect not actionable
under negligence or strict liability theory.
165
In Hiigel v. General Motors Corp., 166 plaintiff sought recovery of
damages when the lug bolt on wheels of a motor home sheared off,
causing the dual rear wheels to part from the vehicle. 167 Plaintiff
sought the cost of repairing the damage to the vehicle as well as
loss of business use of the vehicle during the time of repairs. 168 In
Higel, the Colorado Supreme Court adopted section 402A of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts, and allowed plaintiff to recover dam-
ages for the injury to the product itself.'69 The court declined to
extend the doctrine of section 402A to plaintiffs loss of use
claim, 170 limiting plaintiff's recovery to the physical harm suffered.
There does not seem to be a justifiable reason for denying a
plaintiff the right to recover lost profits where the loss results from
an unreasonably dangerous defect as opposed to a qualitative one.
Those courts which justify such a result in reliance on Seely misin-
terpret the Seely court's position. Seely clearly precludes recovery of
lost profits resulting from qualitative defects in products, relegat-
ing an injured plaintiff to recovery in warranty. The policy analy-
sis set forth by Justice Traynor in Seely does not justify denying a
plaintiff the right to recover lost profits caused by an unreasonably
dangerous defect. An injury to one's business or livelihood can
163. Id. at 857.
164. Id. at 858.
165. See id at 859.
166. 190 Colo. 57, 544 P.2d 983 (1975).
167. Id at 60-61, 544 P.2d at 985.
168. Id. at 60, 544 P.2d at 985.
169. Id at 63, 544 P.2d at 989.
170. Id. The Hiigel theory does not apply to cases involving claims based on negli-
gence. In Cosmopolitan Homes, Inc. v. Weller, 663 P.2d 1041 (Colo. 1983), the Colorado
Supreme Court allowed plaintiff to recover in negligence when the foundation of a home
he bought from a third party cracked. The court allowed plaintiff to recover from the
builder, notwithstanding that the defects in the home were qualitative. The court held
that the builder owed all purchasers of the house a duty to build the house free from
defects in materials and workmanship, and breach of that duty would result in liability for
any such defect. Id at 1045.
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have as great an impact on society as an injury to one's person. 171
By refusing to allow recovery of lost profits, the courts distinguish
between defects causing personal injury and those causing prop-
erty damage-a distinction Justice Traynor was not willing to
make.
In those states that follow the theory of Santor, damages for lost
profits and interruption of business are recoverable. For example,
in Mead Corp. v. Allendale Mutual Insurance Co. 172 the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Ohio allowed plaintiff
to recover for the business losses attributable to a qualitative defect
in an electric turbine. 173 In Cova v. Harl Davidson Motor Co., 174 the
Michigan Court of Appeals reversed a summary judgment in favor
of defendant and allowed plaintiff to return to the trial court to
prove whether it sustained damages for lost rentals of golf carts 175
which resulted when several carts purchased from defendant broke
down as a result of qualitative defects within them. 176 In Air Prod-
ucts & Chemicals, Inc. v. Fairbanks Morse, Inc., 177 the Wisconsin
Supreme Court, applying Pennsylvania law, allowed plaintiff to
recover damages for lost profits178 resulting from the breakdown of
several large electric motors purchased from defendant.179
VI. ADDITIONAL PROBLEMS FACING A
COMMERCIAL PLAINTIFF
Two potential problems face commercial plaintiffs who attempt
to recover damages for an injury to the product itself in either neg-
ligence or strict liability. The first is set forth in Southwest Forest
Industnes, Inc. v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 180 which holds that strict
171. As the New Jersey Superior Court stated:
Even in these days of consumerism, economic interests are not out of favor. Inju-
ries to a man's business can be as detrimental to our society as injuries to his
person. Severe injuries to a family's economic life can be devastating. Corpora-
tions are, in the last analysis, owned by people who rely upon them for income,
and thus commercial losses often are reflected in personal sorrow.
Monsanto Co. v. Alden Leeds, Inc., 130 N.J. Super. 245, 259, 326 A.2d 90, 97 (Law. Div.
1974).
172. 465 F. Supp. 355 (N.D. Ohio 1979).
173. Id at 366.
174. 26 Mich. App. 602, 182 N.W.2d 800 (1970).
175. Id at 620, 182 N.W.2d at 811.
176. Id at 640 n. 1, 182 N.W.2d at 801 n.l.
177. 58 Wis. 2d 193, 206 N.W.2d 414 (1973).
178. Id. at 219, 206 N.W.2d at 428.
179. Id. at 197, 206 N.W.2d at 416.
180. 422 F.2d 1013 (9th Cir.), cert. dntid, 400 U.S. 902 (1970).
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liability is unavailable to certain classes of commercial plaintiffs
for recovery of damages flowing from an injury to the product.,,,
The second problem is set forth in Keystone Aeronautics Corp. v. RJ.
Enstrom Corp., 182 which allows a manufacturer to disclaim all lia-
bility for damages in negligence and strict liability in the contract
for sale.
83
In Southwest Forest, plaintiff sought to recover damages resulting
from defects in a large turbine generator. The contract for sale
contained a disclaimer of liability for negligence, which the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals concluded was not unconscionable under
Pennsylvania law. 1 4 Plaintiff also sought recovery under the the-
ory of strict liability in tort in an attempt to circumvent the dis-
claimer of liability. The court upheld the trial court's decision
that plaintiff was not within the class of consumers to be protected
by the theory of strict liability in tort.
1 8 5
The Southwest Forest theory was followed by the California Court
of Appeals in Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Westinghouse Electric Corp. 186 After
reviewing the history of the development of strict liability theory
in California, the court refused to apply strict liability in an action
between two commercial entities of relatively equal bargaining
power that negotiated the risk of loss from defects in the product,
holding that the basic principles supporting the imposition of strict
liability in consumer products cases are absent in a commercial
setting. 187
181. See 422 F.2d at 1020. The theory set forth in Southwest Forest should be applicable
to actions in negligence as well as actions in strict liability.
182. 499 F.2d 146 (3d Cir. 1974).
183. Id at 149.
184. 422 F.2d at 1019.
185. The court, quoting from the district court's opinion, held:
The circumstances of this case do not bring the plaintiff within that class of
consumers, type of transaction, or damages suffered that created the need for
relief based on strict liability in tort. Neither the philosophy nor the theory of
the doctrine of strict liability in tort nor the actual holdings of the cases involved
support an extension of the doctrine of strict liability in tort to the present facts.
422 F.2d at 1020.
186. 55 Cal. App. 3d 737, 127 Cal. Rptr. 838 (1976).
187. Id at 748, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 845. The court held: "We thus conclude that the
doctrine of products liability does not apply as between parties who (1) deal in a commer-
cial setting; (2) from positions of relatively equal economic strength; (3) bargain the speci-
fications of the product; and (4) negotiate concerning the risk of loss from defects in it."
Id. But see International Knights of Wine, Inc. v. Ball Corp., 110 Cal. App. 3d 1001, 168
Cal. Rptr. 301 (1980). The International Knights court rejected the argument that Kaiser
precluded the imposition of strict tort liability between two commercial enterprises as a
matter of law, choosing rather to allow proof of the actual bargaining power between the
two entities. Id at 1006, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 303.
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In General Pub/c Utilities Corp. v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 188 the
court was called on to determine whether plaintiff could recover in
strict liability under Pennsylvania law for the failure at Three
Mile Island. Plaintiff owned and operated the nuclear power
plant at Three Mile Island, and sought to recover from defendant
for the damages sustained in the March 28, 1979 failure. Relying
on Kaiser, the court dismissed plaintiff's strict liability claim be-
cause plaintiff had equal bargaining strength with defendant,
plaintiff participated in drafting the specifications for the Three
Mile Island plant, and the power plant manufactured by defend-
ant was not a consumer product furnished off the shelf.'
89
In Purvis v. Consolidated Energy Products Co., '90 the Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals applied the theory of Southwest Forest to a claim
by a farmer that a tobacco barn manufactured by defendant failed
to properly cure his tobacco, thereby damaging it. '9' The trial
court directed verdicts in favor of defendant on plaintiffs fraud
and breach of warranty counts, but submitted plaintiffs strict lia-
bility claim to the jury, which returned a verdict in plaintiff's
favor.' 92 The court of appeals reversed the verdict in favor of the
plaintiff, holding that the theory of Southwest Forest and Kaiser
barred a claim by a commercial buyer in privity with the manu-
facturer of a defective product.' 93 In his dissent, Justice Hall ar-
gued that a farmer operating on 600 acres hardly had the
economic strength required to invoke the Southwest Forest
doctrine. 194
The Southwest Forest theory is not universally applied, however.
For example, in Monsanto Co. v. Alden Leeds, Inc., '95 the court relied
on the broad scope of the Santor opinion to hold that any plaintiff,
whether an individual or a commercial enterprise, could use the
188. 547 F. Supp. 842 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
189. Id at 844-45. Accord Scandinavian Airlines Sys. v. United Aircraft Corp., 601
F.2d 425 (9th Cir. 1979); Anglo Eastern Bulkships, Ltd. v. Ameron, Inc., 556 F. Supp.
1198 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); Sioux City Community School Dist. v. International Tel. & Tel.
Corp., 461 F. Supp. 662 (N.D. Iowa 1978); Avenell v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 41 Ohio
App. 2d 150, 324 N.E.2d 583 (1974).
190. 674 F.2d 217 (4th Cir. 1982).
191. Id at 218.
192. Id at 219.
193. Id at 220-22.
194. Id at 224. Justice Hall stated: "We can hardly say that Purvis, a small-time
farmer, operates a large corporate enterprise. To do so yields harsh results, as is evident by
the majority's decision, and unduly restricts the doctrine of strict products liability beyond
that intended by the 'commercial setting' exception." Id
195. 130 N.J. Super. 245, 326 A.2d 90 (Law Div. 1974).
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theory of strict liability if it applied to the circumstances of the
loss. 196
In Keystone Aeronautics Corp. v. R.J. Enstrom Corp., 197 plaintiff
sought recovery for damages arising out of the crash of an airplane
that caused damage to the aircraft itself but no personal injury.
Plaintiff sought recovery under the theories of negligence and
strict liability. The contract of sale between plaintiff and defend-
ant contained a disclaimer of all liability because the sale was "as
is." The court recognized that the social policies behind the adop-
tion of strict tort liability precluded a manufacturer from disclaim-
ing liability in a sale of consumer products. The court found,
however, that those social policies did not preclude business enti-
ties of relatively equal bargaining strength from freely negotiating
and expressly waiving such liability. 98
Similarly, in Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 199 the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, interpreting California law, upheld
the dismissal of negligence and strict liability counts against de-
fendant because of a disclaimer of liability in the contract for sale,
recognizing the financial equality and equal bargaining power of
the parties. 200 In Sterner Aero AB v. Page Airmotive, Inc.,201 the
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, however, refused to recognize de-
fendant's disclaimer of liability for negligence and strict liability
between two entities of equal bargaining power.
20 2
The specific language of the contract for sale does not appear to
be crucial to a decision regarding whether strict liability and negli-
gence liability can be effectively disclaimed. For example, in SA.
Empresa De Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense v. Boeing Co.,20 3 the contract
196. Id. at 259-60, 326 A.2d at 97-98. The court preferred to allow commercial entities
to bargain for the risk of loss in lieu of excluding the class of commercial plaintiffs from the
scope of strict liability theory.
197. 499 F.2d 146 (2d Cir. 1974).
198. Id at 149.
199. 503 F.2d 239 (5th Cir. 1974).
200. Id at 244-45. Accord Aeronaves de Mexico, S.A. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp.,
677 F.2d 771 (9th Cir. 1982); S.A. Empresa de Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense v. Boeing
Co., 641 F.2d 746 (9th Cir. 1981); Tokio Marine & Fire Ins. Co. v. McDonnell Douglas
Corp., 617 F.2d 936 (2d Cir. 1980); Idaho Power Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 596
F.2d 924 (9th Cir. 1979); Ebasco Serv., Inc. v. Pennsylvania Power & Light Co., 460 F.
Supp. 163 (E.D. Pa. 1978); American Elec. Power Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 418 F.
Supp. 435 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. Douglas Aircraft Co., 238 Cal. App. 2d
95, 47 Cal. Rptr. 518 (1966).
201. 499 F.2d 709 (10th Cir. 1974).
202. 499 F.2d at 713.
203. 641 F.2d 746 (9th Cir. 1981).
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for sale of an airplane between plaintiff and Boeing contained a
disclaimer of liability in warranty as well as tort, not limiting itself
to negligence liability only.2°4 The court upheld dismissal of the
plaintiff's claim, relying on the decisions in Delta Aircraft and South-
west Forest. 205 In Tokio Marthe & Fire Insurance Co. v. McDonnell
Douglas Corp., 206 however, the contract for sale disclaimed liability
in warranty and negligence, but did not mention strict liability.
20 7
The court upheld dismissal of plaintiff's claim under a theory of
strict liability,2° 8 notwithstanding the contract which mentioned
negligence, but did not include strict liability or other tort
liability.
VII. ANALYZING THE PROBLEM
In those jurisdictions that follow the Seely theory, property dam-
age caused by an unreasonably dangerous product is recoverable
in negligence and strict liability. The policies underlying the ap-
plication of negligence and strict liability theories to cases involv-
ing personal injury are equally applicable to cases involving
damage to property. If the policies underlying the adoption of
strict liability are to protect society in general from unreasonable
risks of harm caused by defective products and to place the burden
of such risks on the manufacturer who placed the defective prod-
uct in the stream of commerce, then the right to recover damages
in cases involving injury to property ought not turn on the type of
damage sustained, but rather on the type of risk created by the
defective product. If the essential elements of negligence or strict
liability can be proven, recovery should be had for all damages
proximately flowing from the event. To restrict recovery to dam-
ages resulting from direct damage to the product or to other prop-
erty and to exclude recovery for lost profits and business
interruption is not supported by any legal or logical rationale.
. Those states that expand the doctrine of strict liability and neg-
ligence to allow recovery for damages from qualitative product de-
fects have ignored or rejected the concept of unreasonable danger.
embodied in section 402A. Those states have adopted a broad rule
allowing recovery under tort theory for all product defects, based
204. Id at 747-48.
205. Id at 753-54.
206. 617 F.2d 936 (2d Cir. 1980). Accord Aeronaves de Mexico, S.A. v. McDonnell
Douglas Corp., 677 F.2d 771 (9th Cir. 1982).
207. 617 F.2d at 939.
208. Id at 939-40.
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on an underlying desire to place all such risks on the manufac-
turer. From a purely theoretical perspective, the Santor theory
emasculates the legislatively adopted warranty provisions of the
Uniform Commercial Code in favor of a broad rule of tort liabil-
ity. From a theoretical perspective, Justice Traynor's decision in
Seely is more persuasive.
The concern addressed by the courts in Southwest Forest and Ka-
ser requires comment. Clearly the theory of strict liability in tort
developed primarily as a remedy for consumers injured by defec-
tive products who were not in privity with the manufacturer of
those products. The courts adopted the theory of strict liability in
tort as a means of circumventing restrictive privity requirements of
warranty law, to allow injured plaintiffs to recover damages
caused by unreasonably dangerous products without considering
privity questions.
In cases involving transactions between large commercial enter-
prises, the problems leading to the adoption of the theory of strict
liability in tort are not always present. Often the large commercial
buyer is in privity with the commercial seller. Both parties to a
contract for the sale of commercial goods are often in a position to
negotiate the risk of loss. In those situations, applying the war-
ranty concepts of the Uniform Commercial Code rather than the
tort concepts of negligence or strict liability may be more appro-
priate. As long as the question of bargaining power is one of fact
and not one of law, the policies underlying the warranty concepts
of the Uniform Commercial Code and the tort concepts of negli-
gence and strict liability are advanced. In such cases, however, the
contract for sale should clearly specify which remedies are avail-
able to the buyer and which are not.
VIII. CONCLUSION
As is evident from the foregoing discussion, to define a certain
type of loss as "economic" is to determine whether that loss is re-
coverable in negligence or strict liability in most jurisdictions.
Therefore, the successful prosecution of an action involving dam-
ages caused by a defective product hinges primarily on the law-
yer's ability to characterize the damages sustained in order to
allow their recovery under negligence or strict liability theory.
The key questions to answer in determining whether such dam-
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1. Did the damage result from a defect in the product
that goes to the product's ability to perform, or was
the defect one unrelated to the product's intended
function?
2. Did the damage result from an unreasonably danger-
ous defect that posed a risk of harm to persons or
property?
3. Are the damages sought based on a difference be-
tween the value of the product in its defective condi-
tion and its value in a non-defective condition or are
damages sought for the cost of repairing or replacing
the defective product or another property?
4. Did the product cause damage to property other
than the product itself under circumstances where
the defective product simply failed to perform its in-
tended function or under circumstances where the
defective product posed an unreasonable risk of
harm to persons or other property?
5. Do lost profits proximately flow from an unreasona-
bly dangerous defect in a product that also serves as
a basis for recovery of damages for injury to the
product itself or other property, or do those damages
flow from the failure of the product to perform the
function represented by the seller or expected by the
buyer?
6. In cases involving commercial plaintiffs, did the
plaintiff, in fact, have the financial and economic
ability to bargain for a remedy with the seller, or
were the terms of the contract of sale imposed on the
buyer by the seller?
7. In cases involving commercial plaintiffs, does the
contract for sale clearly specify which remedies, if
any, are unavailable to the commercial plaintiff, or
does the contract simply attempt to limit the seller's
liability in broad, general terms?
Resolution of the above issues will determine whether an in-
jured plaintiff can proceed in negligence or strict liability, or must
proceed only in contract or warranty.
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APPENDIX A
DAMAGE TO PRODUCT ITSELF
Unreasonably Dangerous Defect
Recoverabihy Allowed
Alaska: Shooshanian v. Wagner, 672 P.2d 455 (Alaska 1983);
Cloud v. Kit Mfg. Co., 563 P.2d 284 (Alaska 1977).
Arizona: Rocky Mountain Fire & Cas. Co. v. Biddulph
Oldsmobile, 131 Ariz. 289, 640 P.2d 851 (1982).
Arkansas: Berkeley Pump Co. v. Reed-Joseph Land Co., 279
Ark. 384, 653 S.W.2d 128 (1983).
California: Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 403 P.2d
145, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17 (1965);
Gherna v. Ford Motor Co., 246 Cal. App. 2d 639, 55
Cal. Rptr. 94 (1966).
Colorado: Hiigel v. General Motors Corp., 190 Colo. 57, 544
P.2d 983 (1975).
Georgia: Vulcan Materials Co. v. Driltech, Inc., 251 Ga. 383,
306 S.E.2d 253 (1983).
Idaho: Shields v. Morton Chem. Co., 95 Idaho 674, 518 P.2d
857 (1974).
Kansas: Fordyce Concrete, Inc. v. Mack Trucks, Inc., 535 F.
Supp. 118 (D. Kan. 1982).
Kentucky: C & S Fuel, Inc. v. Clark Equip. Co., 524 F. Supp.
949 (E.D. Ky. 1981).
Missouri: Gibson v. Reliable Chevrolet, Inc., 608 S.W.2d 471
(Mo. App. 1980).
Nebraska: National Crane Corp. v. Ohio Steel Tube Co., 213
Neb. 782, 332 N.W.2d 39 (1983).
New Jersey: ICI Australia Ltd. v. Elliott Overseas Co., 551 F.
Supp. 265 (D.N.J. 1982).
New York: John R. Dudley Constr. v. Drott Mfg. Co., 66 A.D.2d
368, 412 N.Y.S.2d 512 (1979).
Oregon: Russell v. Ford Motor Co., 281 Or. 587, 575 P.2d
1383 (1978).
Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania Glass Sand Corp. v. Caterpillar Tractor
Co., 652 F.2d 1165 (3d Cir. 1981).
Texas: Signal Oil & Gas Co. v. Universal Oil Prods., 572
S.W.2d 320 (Tex. 1978) (recovery allowed only if
damage to other property occurred).
W. Virginia: Star Furniture Co. v. Pulaski Furniture Co., 297
S.E.2d 854 (W. Va. 1982).
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Delaware: Cline v. Prowler Indus., Inc., 418 A.2d 968 (Del.
1980).
Texas: Mid Continent Aircraft Corp. v. Curry County
Spraying Serv., Inc., 572 S.W.2d 308 (Tex. 1978).
Qualitative Defect
Recoverability Allowed
Arkansas: Blagg v. Fred Hunt Co., 272 Ark. 185, 612 S.W.2d
321 (1981). But see Berkeley Pump Co. v. Reed-
Joseph Land Co., 279 Ark. 384, 653 S.W.2d 128
(1983) (implicitly overruling Blagg).
Colorado: Cosmopolitan Homes, Inc. v. Weller, 663 P.2d 1041
(Colo. 1983) (negligence only).
Connecticut: CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-572(m) (1983); Verdon v.
Transamerica Ins. Co., 187 Conn. 363, 371 n.6, 446
A.2d 3, 8 n.6 (1982).
Michigan: Cova v. Harley Davidson Motor Co., 26 Mich. App.
602, 182 N.W.2d 800 (1970).
Montana: Thompson v. Nebraska Mobile Homes Corp., -
Mont. -, 647 P.2d 334 (1982).
New Jersey: Santor v. A & M Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 207
A.2d 305 (1965).
N. Dakota: Lang v. General Motors Corp., 136 N.W.2d 805
(N.D. 1965) (negligence only).
Ohio: Mead Corp. v. Allendale Mut. Ins. Co., 465 F. Supp.
355 (N.D. Ohio 1979) (strict liability);
Iacono v. Anderson Concrete Corp., 42 Ohio St. 2d
88, 326 N.E.2d 267 (1975).
Wisconsin: City of LaCrosse v. Schubert, Schroeder & Assocs.,
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